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Corruption and trust in the police: A cross-country study 
Gunnar Thomassen 
International surveys show that trust in the police varies substantially between 
countries. This study investigates the underlying causes of this variation, and in 
particular the effect of perceived corruption in the public sector. A regression analysis 
of 50 countries worldwide suggests that both perceived corruption in the public sector 
and trust in government are important predictors of trust in the police. The homicide 
rate is also statistically significant but seems to have a more modest effect on trust. The 
findings are compatible with previous research findings that procedural concerns trump 
outcomes in explaining trust. Moreover, a correlation analysis suggests that perceived 
corruption in the public sector is more damaging to trust in the police than to trust in 
other government institutions. A plausible explanation for this is that many consider the 
police to be an indispensable institution for social order, and corruption is antithetical 
to this mission. 
Introduction 
Trust, whether interpersonal or in public institutions such as the police, is a field of 
research that has grown considerably during the past 10–15 years. A major driver has 
been the steady accumulation of evidence that trust has many virtues and tangible 
benefits for a society (Ostrom, 1998; Putnam, 2000; Uslaner, 2002). Experimental 
research, for example, has shown that trust and reciprocity are fundamental for co-
operation and collective action (Kohn, 2008; Ostrom, 1998). As for trust in the police, 
evidence exists that trust not only makes the public more co-operative with the police 
but also increases compliance with the law (Hough, Jackson, Bradford, Myhill & 
Quinton, 2010; Levi, Tyler & Sacks, 2008; Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Thus, 
identifying the underlying causes of trust in the police has direct and practical relevance 
to the police as well as to wider society. 
This study focuses on cross-national variation in trust in the police. International 
surveys show substantial cross-national variation in trust (see, for example, the World 
Values Survey and the European Social Survey), and this study attempts to identify 
some of the underlying causes of this variation. The study focuses in particular on the 
link between perception of corruption and trust in the police. While there is probably a 
complex web of factors accounting for variation in trust, the assumption in this study is 
that corruption is a particularly important factor. This seems likely both from a 
theoretical viewpoint and from previous research on trust in the police and other 
government institutions. A core finding in the research literature is that procedural 
fairness, impartiality and honesty in government are very important for the creation and 
maintenance of trust (Hough et al., 2010; Kääriäinen, 2007; Rothstein, 2005; Tyler, 
2001). Corruption is, as Teorell (2009, p. 5) points out, “a way of systematically 
breaching the impartiality principle”. One should therefore expect corruption to have a 
strong negative effect on trust in the police. However, there are other factors or features 
of society that may influence it directly or indirectly, such as rates of crime and public 
safety, socio-political and economic conditions, and regime characteristics. These 
factors must also be considered when measuring the effect of corruption on trust in the 
police. Thus the main research question in this study is: what is the relative effect of 
perceived corruption in the public sector on trust in the police when controlling for other 
relevant factors? Another assumption in this study is that the perception of corruption is 
more consequential for the police than for any other government institution. The main 
role of the police is to enforce the law and to provide social order, and it can safely be 
argued that corruption is antithetical to this mission. Thus, the second research question 
is whether the perception of corruption in the public sector is more strongly associated 
with trust in the police than with trust in other government institutions. 
A cross-national study of corruption and trust in the police has several 
advantages aside from the substantial variation in both corruption and trust 
internationally, and the relative scarcity of such studies. A study that includes countries 
from various parts of the world permits broad generalization across different cultures 
about the effect of perceived corruption. It also provides an opportunity to control for 
potentially important factors, such as type of regime, which is not possible in single 
country studies. Thus, for the purpose of measuring the relative impact of corruption on 
trust in the police, data from 50 countries worldwide have been gathered and merged to 
form one dataset. The data have been extracted from several sources, such as the World 
Values Survey (WVS), Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, The 
World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations development data, and the World 
Bank. 
Previous research 
Most of the literature on trust or confidence in the police concerns variation at the 
individual level and within an Anglo-American context. Central themes in the literature 
include the impact of demographic characteristics (race), contact and experience with 
the police, and neighbourhood conditions (Bradford & Jackson, 2009). Of particular 
interest are findings related to contact and experience with the police. These findings 
suggest that perceptions of procedural fairness, politeness and attention on the part of 
the police are more important than actual outcome when people evaluate their 
experiences (Hough et al., 2010; Jackson & Bradford, 2010; Tyler, 2001, 2006; Tyler & 
Huo, 2002). Trust, according to Tyler (2001, p. 11), is motive based and grounded in the 
belief that the police act in “good faith” and try to do “what is right” no matter what the 
outcome. Fairness and impartiality signal good faith by the police and consequently 
generate trust. 
In many ways, corruption constitutes the ultimate breach of the impartiality 
principle (Pierre & Rothstein, 2010; Teorell, 2009), and not surprisingly, it has been 
found to have a strong negative influence on attitudes towards government institutions 
in general (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003) and the police in particular (Morris, 2011; 
Tankebe, 2010). Kääriäinen (2007) found in a multilevel analysis of 16 European 
countries that corruption, as measured by Transparency International, explained most of 
the variation in trust in the police. Similarly, Morris (2011) found in a multilevel study 
of 53 countries that corruption had a substantial negative effect on trust in the police 
after controlling for factors such as ethnic fractionalization, democratization, general 
life satisfaction and political trust. Tankebe’s (2010) study in Ghana suggests that the 
hypothesized relationship between corruption and trust is valid in a non-Western 
context too. Controlling for demographics, education and political affiliation, he found 
that both vicarious experience and evaluation of corruption reforms have a significant 
effect on confidence. Somewhat surprisingly, there seems to be no statistically 
significant link between personal experience of corruption and confidence in the police. 
However, he points out that this may be the result of defining corruption narrowly to 
include only citizen-initiated corruption and not police-initiated corruption, which is 
more likely to be non-voluntary. Thus the findings “suggest a differentiation between 
various types of corruption experience” when investigating the link with confidence or 
trust (Tankebe, 2010, p. 313; see also Bauhr & Nasiritousi, 2011). 
Perceptions of crime and police effectiveness are also likely to influence trust in 
the police. For example, several studies have found a negative association between fear 
of crime and trust, which may suggest that people hold the police accountable for the 
prevalence of crime (Jackson, Bradford, Stanko & Hohl, 2012). Skogan (2009), on the 
other hand, has found evidence of the converse relationship where trust or confidence in 
the police seems to provide reassurance and thus reduces fear of crime. However, many 
studies have found that people living in neighbourhoods plagued by poverty, crime and 
disorder are far less likely to trust the police than those in more affluent neighbourhoods 
(Bradford, Jackson & Stanko, 2009; Sampson & Jeglum-Bartusch, 1998; Skogan, 
2006). In fact, many studies have found that the racial differences in trust that are so 
prevalent in the U.S. disappear altogether when neighbourhood conditions are 
controlled for (Sampson & Jeglum-Bartusch, 1998; Weitzer & Tuch, 2005). A 
multilevel study by Jang, Joo & Zhao (2010) provides further evidence of a negative 
relationship between crime and trust in the police. Controlling for both individual level 
factors and country-level factors, the authors concluded that people living in countries 
with higher homicide rates have significantly less confidence in the police. 
Variations in trust may also reflect deep structural features of society other than 
corruption and crime, and so are generally beyond the reach of the police. As Reiner 
(2010, p. 58) puts it in his analysis of the rise and fall of police legitimacy in the U.K., a 
concept closely related to trust, “the all-important factor which facilitated the 
legitimation of the police was not an aspect of police policy, but the changing social, 
economic and political context”. A central feature of the post-war (Western) world was 
the rise of the welfare state with the inclusion and increased prosperity of the working 
classes. However, since the 1970s, there has been a marked increase in economic 
inequality throughout Western countries, accompanied by a return of long-term mass 
unemployment in many countries. How this has affected trust in the police around the 
world remains largely unexplored, but economic inequality has been found to be a very 
important predictor of trust in other people (Rothstein & Uslaner 2006; Uslaner, 2002) 
as well as many other societal phenomena (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). One could very 
well imagine the police becoming the target of discontent if the prevailing social, 
economic and political order is widely perceived as unfair. After all, they are the 
ultimate protectors, willing or not, of the societal order. 
Ethnic fragmentation is another factor found to affect trust in the police (Morris, 
2011). It is a widespread perception in many countries that minority groups are unjustly 
targeted by the police and that they are deprived of equal access to police services 
(Durose, Smith & Langan, 2005; Kochel, Wilson & Mastrofski, 2011; Löwe, 2008). It 
is therefore no surprise that minority groups tend to have significantly lower levels of 
trust in the police than the majority of the population in many countries (Bradford & 
Jackson, 2009; Reisig & Parks, 2000; Röder & Mühlau, 2012). 
Empirical studies suggest that trust in the police is positively influenced by trust 
in government institutions in general and overall satisfaction with the way in which 
democracy functions (Christensen & Laegreid, 2002, 2003; Jang et al., 2010; Morris, 
2011). There is also evidence of a strong statistical relationship between interpersonal 
trust (trust in other people) and institutional trust. However, the causal nature of this 
relationship remains unclear. While some argue that trust comes from below through 
socializing (Putnam, 2000), others argue that trust mainly derives from the top, through 
impartial institutions that facilitate trust between individuals (Rothstein, 2005). The 
relationship may also be reciprocal or even spurious. 
There are several factors that may account for differences in trust in the police at 
the national level. Below, I investigate the link between corruption and trust in the 
police while at the same time controlling for the effect of contextual variables such as 
homicide rates, ethnic fragmentation, economic development, economic inequality, civil 
liberties, interpersonal trust and trust in government. 
Data and method 
A total of 50 countries worldwide, both developed and developing, constitute the units 
of analysis in this study. The data for each country have been extracted from several 
sources including the World Values Survey (WVS), Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index, the World Health Organization (WHO), the Ethnic 
Fractionalization Dataset (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, & Wacziarg, 
2003), and United Nations development data. A potential weakness is that the data were 
collected at different points in time. The oldest dataset (ethnic fractionalization) is from 
2003 and the newest dataset is from 2009 (human development index). Ideally, all the 
data should have been collected in the same year. However, the societal features that are 
measured and included in the study appear to change slowly and to be very stable over 
time.  
The data have been merged into a single dataset and analysed using both 
bivariate correlations and OLS regression analysis (using SPSS). The regression 
analysis is useful in measuring the effect of perceived corruption on trust in the police 
while at the same time controlling for other relevant factors.  
 
The dependent variable 
Data on trust in the police have been extracted from the fifth wave of the World Values 
Survey collected in the 2005–2008 period. As in previous surveys, the respondents were 
asked about their confidence in the police and offered four alternative responses: a great 
deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, and no 
confidence at all. For each of the 50 countries included in the study, I have calculated 
the relative proportion (%) of the population that has either a great deal or quite a lot of 
confidence in the police; thus, the variable theoretically ranges from 0 to 100. Although 
it could be argued that only “a great deal of confidence” should be included, the 
assumption is made here that both “a great deal” and “quite a lot” indicate an overall 
attitude of trust in the police. The concepts of trust and confidence are also used 
interchangeably in this analysis, although it could be argued that trust and confidence 
are somewhat different concepts. However, this seems to be the case, primarily in the 
context of interpersonal trust, which may be said to have an altruistic or moral 
component (Mansbridge, 1999, Uslaner, 2002). It is reasonable to assume that trust in 
institutions, although not value free, is based more on rational predictions and thus is 
closer to the concept of confidence. In addition, I find that the confidence scores of the 
17 European countries included in the study correlate very strongly with their trust score 
in the European Social Survey (Pearson’s r = .842). 
Independent variables 
Corruption 
Measuring corruption is quite “tricky” (Uslaner, 2005). So far, the best measure 
developed for cross-national studies is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by 
Transparency International. The working definition of corruption used by Transparency 
International is the abuse of public power for private benefit (Transparency 
International, 2009; see also Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001). The CPI measures perception 
of public sector corruption in 180 countries, using a composite index of 13 expert and 
business surveys from 10 independent institutions. The Corruption Perception Index 
ranges from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt). For the purpose of making the 
interpretation of the variable more intuitive, I have reversed the scale so that 0 = least 
corrupt while 10 = most corrupt.  
Intentional homicide 
As a measure of violent crime in each country, I use intentional homicides per 100,000 
people as estimated by the World Health Organization. Intentional homicide as defined 
here means all death caused by another person with intent to injure or kill by any means 
(WHO, 2004). It excludes deaths due to legal intervention or operations of war. The 
reason that I do not use a broader measure of violent crime is that reliable statistics are 
very hard to come by, even in countries such as Norway and Sweden. The only 
exception to this rule is homicide statistics, which are fairly reliable, at least in the most 
economically advanced nations. However, for countries in the third world, even 
homicide statistics should be treated with caution, especially in those experiencing 
internal conflict. Nevertheless, I consider that the data provide at least an approximate 
estimate of differences in numbers of homicides across countries. 
Socio-economic development 
As a measure of socio-economic development, I use the UN Human Development Index 
(UNDP, 2010). The HDI measures three basic dimensions of human development: life 
expectancy, educational attainment and income. The scores for the three HDI dimension 
indices are aggregated into a composite index with a geometric mean. The HDI sets a 
minimum and a maximum level for each dimension, called goal posts, and shows where 
each country stands in relation to them expressed as a value between 0 and 1. A low 
score indicates a low level of development, and a high score indicates a high level of 
development. 
Economic inequality 
As a measure of economic inequality, I use the GINI index developed by the World 
Bank for distribution of family income. The GINI index is widely used as a measure of 
inequality and is considered very robust. It has many desirable properties, such as mean 
independence, population size independence and symmetry (Haugthon & Khander, 
2009). The index used here ranges from 0 (perfect equality) to 100 (perfect inequality). 
Ethnic fractionalization 
Data measuring ethnic fractionalization have been taken from Alesina et al. (2003). The 
variable takes into account both racial and linguistic characteristics of the population, 
and indicates the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population 
belong to different groups. Thus, theoretically the variable ranges between 0 (no 
fractionalization) and 1 (complete fractionalization). 
Civil liberties 
As a measure of the level of political freedom or liberty in each state, I use the Civil 
Liberties score developed by Freedom House. The Civil Liberty score takes into 
account freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule 
of law, and personal autonomy without interference by the state. The liberty score 
ranges from 1 to 7, which indicate the lowest and highest levels of freedom, 
respectively. To make this intuitively understandable, I have reversed the scale so that a 
high score indicates a high degree of freedom. The civil liberty scores used in this study 
were collected the same year as the trust data. 
Interpersonal trust 
Interpersonal trust is also taken from the World Values Survey. It uses the following 
question to measure interpersonal trust: “Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted, or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” 
Respondents are offered two possible responses: “Most people can be trusted” and 
“Can’t be too careful”. For this analysis, I have registered the percentage of people in 
each country who respond that most people can be trusted. 
Trust in government 
To ascertain whether trust in the police might stem from a more general and diffuse 
trust in public institutions, I have aggregated WVS data on confidence in the 
government. As with the above question regarding police, there are four possible 
responses: a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much 
confidence, and no confidence at all. I have calculated the relative proportion (%) of the 
population that has either a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in government; thus, 
the variable theoretically ranges from 0 to 100. 
Variations in trust in the police 
A natural starting point for the analysis is to examine the distribution of the dependent 
variable trust in the police. There is a great deal of variation across the 50 countries in 
the sample, as can be seen from Table 1. The proportion of the population reporting a 
great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the police ranges from 92% to only 16% (see 
also Appendix, Table I). 
Table 1 about here 
The statistics in Table 1 suggest that the distribution is approximately normal 
(this is confirmed by visual inspection of a histogram). The average proportion of the 
population with confidence in the police is 55.9 %, while the median is 56.5% with a 
standard deviation of 19.3%. The distribution is only slightly skewed towards the lower 
end (–.159). The great variation and approximately normal distribution of the dependent 
variable make it very well suited for further statistical analysis. 
Correlates of trust in police 
Before moving on to the multiple regression analysis, it may be useful to investigate the 
bivariate relationship between trust in the police and the independent variables 
described above. The statistical relationships (Pearson’s r) between trust in the police 
and these factors are reported in Table 2. 
Table 2 about here 
As Table 2 shows, many of the independent variables have a strong and 
statistically significant relationship with trust in the police. With the exception of two 
variables, ethnic fragmentation and economic inequality, they all have coefficients 
larger than ± .40, and all except economic inequality are significant at the 0.01 level. 
Not surprisingly, the correlation between corruption and trust is negative, and it is by far 
the strongest relationship identified in the bivariate analysis (Pearson’s r = –.74). 
However, one can also see that homicide rates, which I have log transformed because of 
some extreme outliers, correlate quite strongly with trust in the police (Pearson’s r = –
.50), suggesting that concerns about crime matter. Furthermore, there is a strong 
correlation between trust in the police and trust in general, particularly trust in other 
people (Pearson’s r = .58), and trust in government (Pearson’s r = .49). Finally we see 
that both the level of human development in the country and the status of civil liberties 
have a fairly strong statistical relationship with trust in the police (both Pearson’s r = 
.44). The weakest correlations are with ethnic fractionalization (Pearson’s r = –.39) and 
economic inequality (Pearson’s r = –.29), which have a more moderate relationship with 
trust in the police. 
Predictors of trust in the police 
The bivariate analysis suggests that several factors influence trust in the police at the 
national level. To measure the effect of each independent variable more accurately, the 
other variables need to be controlled for in a multiple regression analysis. For that 
purpose, I use the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method. In Table 3, I present the result 
of the regression analysis with all the independent variables included in the model. 
Table 3 about here 
The full model with all the specified variables included seems to explain 
approximately 74% of the variance (R² = .739). Three of the variables are statistically 
significant, namely, corruption, trust in government and intentional homicide. 
Corruption has the strongest effect on trust in the police, with a standardized (beta) 
coefficient of –.554. The unstandardized coefficient (B) is –4.47. This means that for 
every unit a country moves up the (reversed) corruption perception index, which ranges 
from 1 to 10, the relative proportion of the population that has a great deal or quite a lot 
of confidence in the police decreases by approximately 4.5%. Furthermore, we see that 
the level of trust in government has an almost equally strong (positive) effect on trust in 
the police, with a beta coefficient of .466. Finally, we see that intentional homicide has 
a moderate but still statistically significant impact on trust (p < 0.1), with a standardized 
(beta) coefficient of –.265. The socio-economic and political variables included in the 
model appear to have no direct impact on aggregated trust in the police. 
A note of caution has to be raised about the possibility of multicollinearity, 
because many of the independent variables correlate quite strongly with each other (see 
Appendix, Table II). Of the 28 pairs of possible correlations between the independent 
variables, two coefficients are over ± .70, six are above ± .65 and five are over ± .50. To 
test for possible multicollinearity, both the Tolerance and Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) scores were checked. Although some of the tolerance scores are quite low in the 
model, they are nevertheless all above/under the score considered to indicate a problem 
with multicollinearity (see Appendix, Table III). 
Interestingly, the only independent variable in the model that does not correlate 
with corruption is level of trust in government. One might suppose that trust in 
government would be at least moderately correlated with corruption, but there is in fact 
no statistically significant relationship between the two variables. Corruption does 
indeed correlate with trust in public institutions such as parliament and the civil service 
but only to a moderate degree (Table 4). We also see that corruption correlates quite 
strongly with trust in the legal system although not as strongly as with the police. 
Corruption, it seems, is first and foremost damaging to trust in policing and judicial 
institutions. 
Table 4 about here. 
Discussion and conclusion 
The study suggests that perceived corruption is an important predictor of trust in the 
police and that it explains a substantial part of cross-national variation in trust. The 
findings are consistent with previous research on corruption and trust as well as with an 
impressive amount of evidence demonstrating the importance of honest, fair and 
impartial policing in creating trust in the police. Corruption represents a clear violation 
of these principles and is therefore likely to undermine trust in the police. Corruption 
also appears to be more damaging to trust in the police than to other public institutions 
such as parliament, the legal system and the civil service. The partisan nature of 
representational institutions such as parliament and cabinet probably makes them less 
vulnerable to violations of the impartiality principle than bureaucratic institutions. One 
of the main findings in Anderson and Tverdova’s (2003) study on trust in government 
was that the effect of corruption is contingent on whether the respondent supported the 
incumbent. However, it is not clear why the legal system and the civil service should be 
less vulnerable to corruption. One explanation is that the potential consequences of 
police corruption are very serious for most people. Because the police force is the main 
provider of basic public security, widespread police corruption can severely undermine 
the quality of life of the citizens (Goldsmith, 2005). The police are also considered by 
many to be an indispensable institution for social order. In this role, it is imperative that 
the police act in an honest and impartial manner. Thus, many expect the police not only 
to abide by the rules but also to act as role models. 
Trust in government appears to be another important predictor of trust in the 
police. The effect of trust in government is almost equal to the effect of corruption on 
trust in the police. This finding is in line with previous research suggesting that trust in 
government benefits the police (Morris, 2011). The benefits of trust in government may 
be both direct and indirect. First, it is reasonable to assume that trust or distrust in 
government is to some extent transferred to the police (Morris, 2011). Trust in one 
institution tends to extend to others (Christensen & Laegreid, 2002). However, trust in 
government may also have an indirect effect on trust in the police by making the public 
more receptive to policing. Acting on behalf of the government is presumably less risky 
if the public is positive and trusting in the state and the government. Moreover, a 
government that is considered trustworthy may also generate less demand for police 
intervention because citizens are more willing to comply with laws and regulations 
passed by the government. Previous research has shown that police–citizen encounters 
are far more likely to result in loss of trust than the opposite (Skogan, 2006; Bradford et 
al., 2009). Thus, the less the police are needed in society, the better for trust in the 
police. 
Homicide levels were found to have a statistically significant effect on trust in 
the police, but they appear to explain far less of the variation than corruption and trust in 
government. Thus, the finding is compatible with previous research suggesting that 
procedural concerns trump outcomes in explaining trust. However, it may be that other 
more common types of crime also have an effect on trust in the police. Research from 
the U.S. and the U.K., for example, suggests that minor crimes and disorder have a 
significant impact on trust in the police (Kautt, 2011; Myhill & Bradford, 2011). In fact, 
such “signal crimes” appear to have a stronger effect than more serious crime. Thus, 
future cross-country studies on trust in the police should, if possible, include other types 
of crime than homicide. 
The remaining variables in the model were not found to have any significant 
impact on trust in the police. There may, however, be an indirect link between trust in 
the police and some of these variables. Interpersonal trust, for example, has previously 
been found to be a very important predictor of corruption, while economic inequality 
has been found to be a very important factor in explaining variations in interpersonal 
trust (Uslaner, 2005, see also Rothstein & Uslaner, 2006). The possible indirect links 
between these independent variables and trust in the police should be examined further. 
In addition, there may be an indirect link between socio-economic development 
and trust in the police. The Nordic welfare states (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland 
and Iceland), for example, are all characterized by exceptionally high levels of trust in 
the police. It may be that, as Kääriäinen (2007) contends, active welfare policies help to 
reduce the levels of crime and conflict in these countries. This again has the double 
benefit of reducing demand for the police while at the same time giving the police credit 
for the relatively low levels of crime. 
The list of independent variables included in this study is not exhaustive. There 
are other factors that may account for some of the differences in trust. The low-trusting 
countries in Eastern Europe, for example, have a legacy of totalitarian regimes that 
actively sought to sow distrust between citizens, and the primary goal of the police in 
these states was to protect the regime rather than to serve the public. This legacy is 
likely to affect trust and will continue to do so for many years to come. Trust over time 
appears to be a persistent phenomenon that changes very slowly (Egge, Strype & 
Thomassen, 2012; Inglehart, 1999). Some nations have also recently experienced, or are 
currently experiencing, internal war and conflict. This should be taken into 
consideration when analysing differences in trust. Finally, while most of the countries 
included in the study seem to fall along the trust continuum roughly as expected, there 
are some exceptions (see Appendix, Table I). Some, such as Turkey, Italy and Mali, 
score and rank surprisingly high, while the Netherlands, which is otherwise quite similar 
to the Nordic countries, scores and ranks unexpectedly low. Such cases deserve closer 
examination. For example, is it a measurement error or are there particular factors, 
historically, culturally or otherwise, that might explain why the Dutch police score 
comparatively low? Studying these seemingly anomalous cases may offer new insights 
into the creation of (dis)trust. 
This study has used only one general measure of trust in the police. However, 
the research literature suggests that trust is a multidimensional concept reflecting 
perceptions of effectiveness as well as procedural justice and moral alignment (Hough 
et al., 2010; Jackson & Bradford, 2010; Jackson et al., 2011). Future comparative 
studies should therefore also examine how dimensions of trust vary between countries 
and in relation to structural variables such as corruption, crime, and economic 
inequality. Better and more nuanced measurements of corruption are also needed. 
Studies suggest that not all types of corruption have a negative effect on trust in the 
police (Bauhr & Nasiritousi, 2011; Tankebe, 2010). A measure that differentiates 
between various types of corruption could help to advance our knowledge of the 
relationship between corruption and trust. 
The apparently strong link between corruption and trust highlights the 
importance of working actively to reduce both actual and perceived corruption, 
especially for the police. If broad sections of the public lack trust in the police, it will be 
very hard, if not impossible, for the police to fulfil their basic tasks. However, trust in 
the police does not only concern advancing co-operation and compliance with the law. 
A lack of trust in the police is also likely to undermine many people’s sense of safety 
and ultimately their subjective well-being. Trust in the police should therefore be seen 
as a goal in itself, not merely a means to an end. 
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Tables and Appendix 
Table 1 Trust in the police across 50 countries 
Mean 55.9 
Median 56.5 
Standard Deviation 19.3 
Skewness -.159 
Minimum 15.8  
Maximum 91.8  
 
Table 2 Correlates of trust in the police 
Independent variables Pearsons r 
Corruption (CPI) -.74*** 
Intentional homicide (rate per 100000)  -.50*** 
Ethnic fractionalization -.39*** 
Human development index (HDI) .44*** 
Economic inequality -.29** 
Civil liberties .44*** 
Interpersonal  trust .58*** 
Trust in government .49*** 
***Significant at 0.01 level, **Significant at 0.05 level, *Significant at 0.1 level. 
 
Table 3 Predictors of trust in the police  
Model B Std. Error Beta t 
Constant 104.56*** 28.13  3.717 
Corruption (CPI) -4.47*** 1.30 -.554 -3.435 
Homicide rate 
(Log transformed) 
-31.74* 17.11 -.265 -1.855 
Trust in 
government 
.58*** .11 .466 5.315 
Interpersonal trust .10 .13 .094 .776 
Income inequality -.13 .26 -.068 -.522 
Development 
(HDI) 
-13.32 16.21 -.120 -.822 
Civil liberties -.35 1.59 -.025 -.220 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
-1.41 8.86 -.018 -.159 
Adjusted R² .739    
F 17.239***    
***Significant at the 0.01 level, **Significant at 0.05 level, *Significant at 0.1 level 
 
Table 4 Correlation between corruption and trust in various public institutions 
Police Government Legal system Civil service Parliament 
-.744*** -.102 -.450*** -.271* -.285** 
***Significant at 0.01 level, **Significant at 0.05 level, *Significant at 0.1 level. 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
  
Table I. Relative share of the population reporting to have a lot of confidence or 
quite a lot of confidence in the police  
Country % 
Finland 91,80 
Norway   87,30 
Switzerland  83,50 
Australia  83,10 
Hong Kong  82,90 
Canada  81,70 
Italy  78,30 
Sweden  77,80 
New Zealand  75,70 
Malaysia  74,60 
Germany  73,90 
Great Britain  73,00 
Turkey 72,00 
France  71,20 
United States  70,30 
Mali  67,20 
Japan  66,90 
Cyprus 64,90 
India  64,10 
Spain  64,00 
South Africa  61,90 
Morocco  61,40 
Netherlands  59,40 
South Korea  58,60 
Chile  57,10 
Iran  55,90 
Bulgaria  54,80 
Ghana  54,70 
Uruguay  53,00 
Burkina Faso  52,60 
Indonesia  50,70 
Colombia  49,80 
Georgia   47,10 
Poland  47,10 
Zambia  45,00 
Brazil  44,80 
Thailand  43,50 
Romania  39,80 
Slovenia  38,40 
Taiwan  37,50 
Serbia  35,00 
Ukraine  34,00 
Mexico  33,60 
Russian Federation  33,30 
Ethiopia  32,10 
Trinidad and Tobago 28,00 
Guatemala  24,90 
Moldova  24,30 
Argentina  21,30 
Peru  15,80 
 
Table II. Correlation matrix for independent variables 
 CPI        
CPI 1 Civ lib       
Civ. Lib -.69*** 1 Ethnic       
Ethnic .57*** -.54*** 1 Homic     
Homic .59*** -.52*** .64*** 1 HDI    
HDI -.74*** -.69*** -.69*** -.65*** 1 Inequal   
Inequal .34** -.39*** .42*** .71*** -.34** 1 Int trust  
Int trust -.69*** .41*** -.41*** -.40*** .52**
* 
-.46*** 1 Trust 
gov 
Trust 
gov 
-.10 -.07 .17 .21 -.21 -.27* .06 1 
***Significant at 0.01 level, **Significant at 0.05 level, *Significant at 0.1 level. 
 
Table III. Collinearity Statistics (First Model) 
Independent variables Tolerance Variation Inflation Factor (VIF) 
Corruption (CPI) .218 4.578 
Homicide rate (Log 
transformed) 
.279 3.583 
Trust in government .740 1.351 
Interpersonal trust .388 2.578 
Income inequality .339 2.946 
Development (HDI) .268 2.730 
Civil liberties .446 2.244 
Ethnic Fractionalization .452 2.214 
 
 
